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I. INTRODUCTION
What do opticians in Oklahoma have in common with pregnant women
in Texas? On the surface, the answer would seem to be very little, aside
from a shared state border. Before I explain why the question is posed in this
fashion, let me ask what pregnant women in Texas have in common with the
following: men who watch dirty movies in their homes; suspicious men who
"case" jewelry stores; men who place bets from telephone booths; people
who import window glass; parents who want their children to study German
in public schools; and convicted murderers who seek new trials? Again, the
answer would seem to be very little.
The answers to both questions are: very little and a great deal. Both the
Oklahoma opticians and the mixed bag of other people are connected to
pregnant women in Texas by the common bond of involvement in the United
States Supreme Court cases that were cited as precedent on both sides in Roe
v. Wade.' Justice (now Chief Justice) William Rehnquist cited in his
dissenting opinion a case involving opticians in Oklahoma as his one and
only precedent for the argument that the Constitution does not provide a right
of "privacy" that would protect women seeking abortions from criminal
prosecution.2 On the other side, Justice Harry Blackmun, writing for the
majority in Roe, cited the cases described above among those he utilized to
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Id. at 173 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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argue that the Constitution does include-or at least implies-a right to
privacy "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy."
3
It may seem a far stretch to analogize between opticians and abortion, or
between abortion and such issues as pornography, bookmaking, language
instruction, murder trials, and "stop and frisk" practices. If the use of
precedent is thought of as a search for cases "on point," there is little that
appears "on point" in these cases. But judges in general-and Justices of the
Supreme Court in particular-are not bound by any rules in citing
precedent. They often cite as precedent cases that are factually dissimilar to
those at issue, looking for a broadly stated principle of law that could add
some authority to the argument they are constructing, or to the conclusion
they have reached.
On occasion, as illustrated by the Roe opinions of Justices Rehnquist
and Blackmun, the search for precedent becomes creative and imaginative. I
do not mean this in a pejorative way, because legal reasoning is not simply a
process of stacking up cases that are factually similar. Argumentation can
and should be creative and imaginative; that is why we have such terms as
metaphor and simile, apposition and juxtaposition. In some situations,
comparing apples to oranges may prove to be fruitful; they are both fruits,
roughly spherical, and grow on trees. They have more in common than
opticians and abortion.
Let me start with Justice Rehnquist and the case he cited as precedent in
his Roe opinion, Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.4 He cited this 1955 decision
for the following proposition: "'[T]he test traditionally applied in the area of
social and economic legislation is whether or not a law such as that
challenged [in Roe] has a rational relation to a valid state objective.' 5 That
sentence provides a good, brief statement of the so-called "rational basis" test
applied by the Court to determine the constitutionality of "social and
economic" legislation. In contrast, the "strict scrutiny" test is applied to
legislation that is alleged to infringe on fundamental rights or to create
suspect classifications. This latter jurisprudential test derives from the
famous "Footnote Four" in Justice Harlan Fiske Stone's 1938 opinion in
United States v. Carolene Products.6 The "rational basis" test has earlier
roots, but over the past six decades the competing tests have essentially
3. Id. at 153.
4. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
5. Roe, 410 U.S. at 173 (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491
(1955)).
6. 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
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polarized the debate over the proper level of judicial scrutiny in
constitutional cases.
There is nothing illegitimate in Justice Rehnquist's citation to Lee
Optical in his Roe dissent. His search for precedent led him to a rather
obscure, and certainly not momentous, case. However, his statement of its
central principle is misleading; in fact, it is flatly wrong. The Court's
opinion in Lee Optical did not state that the "rational basis" test applied to
"social and economic legislation," as Justice Rehnquist wrote. It limited the
use of that highly deferential test to state laws that regulated "business and
industrial conditions," hardly the same thing as "social and economic"
legislation.7 The case Justice Rehnquist actually should have cited in his Roe
opinion was not Lee Optical, but the Court's 1979 decision in Dandridge v.
Williams,8 in which Justice Potter Stewart put the Lee Optical decision into
totally new frames, so to speak. It was Justice Stewart who cited Lee Optical
for the proposition that in "deal[ing] with state regulation in the social and
economic field, not affecting freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights," the
Court would apply the "rational basis" test.9
II. A CLOSER LOOK AT LEE OPTICAL
Let us take a closer look, through the corrective lenses of hindsight, at
the Lee Optical case, to find out why it has become Justice Rehnquist's
favorite precedent in cases dealing with issues such as abortion, nude
dancing, and the rights of illegitimate children, among others. This case
stemmed from a political battle over the eyeglass business in Oklahoma. The
state's opticians (who grind lenses and fit them into frames) were pitted
against optometrists (who have doctoral degrees and measure vision) and
ophthalmologists (who are medical doctors and treat eye diseases). The
Court's opinion in Lee Optical tells us nothing about this political battle, but
it is fair to assume that Oklahoma's optometrists and ophthalmologists (call
them the eye doctors) complained to state legislators that opticians (call them
the grinders) were cutting into their business by duplicating eyeglass lenses
without sending their clients to the doctors for prescriptions. Opticians are
capable of duplicating lenses without prescriptions; this is a fairly simple
task, as the many "one-hour" optical shops illustrate. However, the eye
doctors argue vigorously (as my optometrist recently did to me) that new eye
examinations and prescriptions are essential to correct vision changes and
7. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 488.
8. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
9. Id. at 484.
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detect possible eye diseases such as glaucoma. Having a lens duplicated
without a prescription could endanger one's vision and eye health. That, at
least, is what the eye doctors claim.
That claim persuaded the Oklahoma legislature to pass a law providing
(in pertinent part, as lawyers like to say) that "it [shall be] unlawful for any
person.., to duplicate... [any] lenses... [without a] written prescripti[on]
[from an] ophthalmologist or optometrist."' The Lee Optical Company
challenged the law in federal district court, filing suit against Oklahoma's
Attorney General, Mac Q. Williamson. The opticians won a judgment that
the law violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in
restricting their "liberty" to practice their profession. Williamson appealed to
the Supreme Court on the state's behalf, and won a reversal of the lower
court's decision.1
This was a fairly simple case for the Justices. A long line of precedent,
stretching back to the nineteenth century, proclaimed the principle-as stated
by the Court in Munn v. Illinois12 in 1877-that "[f]or protection against
abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to the
courts. 13 In other words, if Oklahoma's opticians did not like the new law,
they should set up a political action committee (EYE-PAC, perhaps) and
lobby for its repeal or revision. In many other cases, including Carolene
Products, the Court had upheld state and federal laws that regulated
"business and industrial conditions" against Due Process Clause
challenges. 14 In most of these cases, the Justices found a "rational basis" for
the law in statements by its sponsors, either in committee hearings or during
floor debate, recorded in the legislative history of the statute.
The Court faced a slight problem in the Lee Optical case. Apparently,
the Oklahoma legislature made no record of its hearings or debates. The
legislative history of the challenged statute did not exist. That did not faze
Justice William 0. Douglas, who wrote for the Court. He simply imagined,
or invented, possible "reasons" the legislators may have advanced for the
law. 1 5 Justice Douglas began with an admission that "[t]he Oklahoma law
may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in many cases. But it is for the
legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the
new requirement" that opticians cannot grind lenses without a
10. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 485 (citation omitted).
11. Id. at 491.
12. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
13. Id. at 134.
14. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938).
15. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 487.
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prescription. 16 How had the legislature reached that judgment? Justice
Douglas filled in the gaps with speculation. "ITihe legislature might have
concluded," he wrote, that prescriptions were necessary in enough cases to
justify the law.1 7 He used the words "might" and "may" at least a dozen
times in his opinion, with absolutely no support from any record.
What is the relevance of this repeated supposition and speculation to
Justice Rehnquist's citation of Lee Optical in his Roe opinion? It saved him
the trouble of finding an actual "rational basis" for the Texas law that
criminalized abortions.18 This law, first enacted in 1854, had no recorded
legislative history. 9 The possible reasons for the criminal abortion statute,
advanced by the state's lawyers during oral argument before the Supreme
Court, were totally speculative. The lawyers guessed that "protection of the
mother, at one time," may have been the Texas legislature's intent.20 The
lawyers also speculated that "when this statute was first passed, there was
some concern for the unborn fetus." 21 Needless to say, the state's lawyers
did not have the faintest support for their speculations. This hardly
constitutes, in my mind, any "rational basis" for the Texas criminal abortion
statute, since no reasons were proffered in any record. Guessing the intent of
long-dead legislators cannot manufacture a "rational basis" for any statute,
unless Madame Blavatsky is sitting next to the judge.
Should this reliance on speculation make any difference to the
legitimacy of the "rational basis" test as applied by Justice Douglas in Lee
Optical and Justice Rehnquist in his Roe opinion? I suggest that it does, by
allowing judges to relieve legislators from their duty to articulate, in some
record, sufficient reasons for their decisions that can be examined for
possible bias or error. Justice Douglas may well have been correct in
imagining what the Oklahoma legislators "might have" intended in passing
their law, but he might equally have been wrong, and the statute may have
suffered from serious defects. We simply have no way of knowing, and the
"rational basis" test does not require that judges know anything about the
"real" reasons any law was adopted. Further, it implies that judges do not,
and should not, care about those reasons.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117-19 (1973) (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§
1191-1194 (1911)).
19. Id. at 119 (citing 3 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OFTEXAS 1502 (1898)).
20. LANDMARK BREFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNrrED
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, Vol. 75, 802-03 (P. Kurland and G. Casper, eds. 1973).
21. Id. at 803.
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This reliance on the "rational basis" test is the logical extension of legal
positivism. This is the jurisprudential philosophy that any law that is duly
enacted by a legislature is, ipsofacto, constitutional. By his own admission,
Justice Rehnquist is a committed legal positivist. Laws "take on a form of
moral goodness because they have been enacted into positive law," he argued
in the most elaborated statement of his judicial philosophy.22 Exceptions to
this jurisprudential rule would be hard to find, and would be limited to those
laws that on their face violate an explicit provision of the Constitution. The
"rational basis" test, as applied by Justice Rehnquist, is virtually impossible
to flunk.
I. A QUICK SLAP AT JUSTICE STEWART
It is not entirely fair to blame Justice Rehnquist for his misreading of the
Lee Optical decision, in which Justice Douglas limited the application of the
"rational basis" test to laws that regulated "business and industrial
conditions."23 Of course, Justice Rehnquist (or his clerks) should have
carefully read the Lee Optical opinion and quoted it correctly for the
principle he purported to find in it, that his favored judicial test applied to a
broader range of "social and economic" legislation. For this misreading of
precedent, whether deliberate or not, Justice Rehnquist deserves censure.
However, the real blame for this unwarranted expansion of the Lee Optical
principle rests with Justice Potter Stewart. His 1970 opinion in Dandridge v.
Williams allowed the Court to evade the "strict scrutiny" test in cases that
raised issues of "fundamental rights" and that challenged "suspect
classifications" by legislators. 24
The Dandridge case involved a Maryland law that placed a cap on
welfare payments to families with dependent children.25 The law provided
that families with six or more children could receive no more benefits than
those with five children.26 In other words, the "excess" children received no
money for food or clothing. This law was clearly intended to punish families
(almost all headed by single mothers) who exceeded the state legislature's
notion of proper family size. It would be fatuous to ignore the political and
racial context of this legislation; states like Maryland (and Congress as well)
22. William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REv. 693,
704 (1976).
23. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,485 (1970).
24. Id. at 471.
25. Id. at 473.
26. Id. at 474.
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were dominated in the late 1960s by conservative white voters who resented
giving their tax dollars to African-American women who kept having
children just to increase their welfare funding. However incorrectly the
voters perceived the welfare issue (in fact, most families who received Aid to
Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") benefits were white), and
however tainted by racial prejudice, they acted on their beliefs. This was the
political reality of those years, however much we may want to erase it from
our memories.
The Supreme Court, speaking through the patrician Justice Stewart,
closed its eyes and ears to this reality. Justice Stewart conceded that the
Maryland law produced "some disparity in grants of welfare payments to the
largest AFDC families."27 He also conceded that the case "involves the most
basic economic needs of impoverished human beings." Justice Stewart
further admitted that the "rational basis" cases-including Lee Optical-on
which he relied for precedent "have in the main involved state regulation of
business or industry."29 So why did he extend the Lee Optical principle,
limited by Justice Douglas to cases involving "business and industrial
conditions," to the much broader category of "social and economic"
legislation? Justice Stewart did not explain this jurisprudential
expansion. He simply wrote the following words: "We recognize the
dramatically real factual difference between the cited cases and this one, but
we can find no basis for applying a different constitutional standard. 30
Why not? The Maryland legislature certainly had a "rational basis" for
the law, in saving taxpayer dollars, but was that enough? Do children have a
"fundamental right" to food and clothing? Or did the legislature create a
"suspect classification" by discriminating between larger and smaller
families, without regard to their needs? These seem to me to be relevant
questions, worthy of judicial scrutiny, but Justice Stewart brushed them
aside, concluding (without any discussion) that the Maryland law did "not
affect[] freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights," presumably the only
rights protected against governmental deprivation.
Am I being unfair to Justice Stewart? After all, the development and
progression of constitutional doctrine requires (in appropriate cases) the
expansion of principles developed in one era to cover situations that arise in
later times. But I think, at least in the Dandridge case, that he stretched the
27. Id. at 484.
28. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 508.
29. Id. at 485.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 484.
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Lee Optical principle far beyond the limits that Justice Douglas had intended
to impose on his fellow judges. Justice Rehnquist, in turn, stretched the
Dandridge principle even further, since it would be difficult-if not
impossible-to deny that the abortion question does not raise a "liberty"
claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Rehnquist, in fact, conceded
in his Roe dissent that the "liberty" interest "embraces more than the rights
found in the Bill of Rights. 32 Whatever those rights may be, they certainly
require more judicial scrutiny than the "rational basis" test provides, which is
the bare minimum. To hold otherwise is to depreciate those basic
constitutional rights; to see them as deserving of no more judicial scrutiny
than the regulation of the Oklahoma eyeglass business.
Before I let Justice Rehnquist escape from my critical lens, let me point
out that he has continued to cite the Lee Optical case as precedent in dozens
of opinions, both before and after Roe. For example, writing in solo dissent
in 1972, he relied on Lee Optical in arguing that illegitimate children (whose
paternity had been acknowledged by their deceased father) had no right to
benefits granted their legitimate siblings under workmen's compensation law
in Louisiana.33 And in 1986, writing for the Court in a case that upheld the
power of cities to zone "adult theaters" into the boondocks far from
downtown areas, Justice Rehnquist again relied on Lee Optical for support.34
Even on the abortion issue, Justice Rehnquist still trots out his favorite
precedent. Having failed to find the indispensable fifth vote to overturn the
Roe decision, he grudgingly bowed to reality in 1992, when Justices Sandra
O'Connor, David Souter, and Anthony Kennedy wrote (delivering "the
opinion of the Court" in Planned Parenthood v. Casey35) that "the essential
holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again reaffirmed." 36
Justice Rehnquist conceded in his Casey dissent that "[a] woman's interest in
having an abortion is a form of liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause,, 37 but he continued to insist, citing Lee Optical, that "[s]tates may
regulate abortion procedures in ways rationally related to a legitimate state
interest."38 In other words, even if a right is protected by the Constitution,
and state laws that deprive someone of that right are subject to the "strict
scrutiny" test, laws that limit the exercise of that right short of absolute
deprivation should be examined under the highly deferential "rational basis"
32. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 172-73 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
33. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 179-80, 183-85 (1972).
34. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 53 (1986).
35. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
36. Id. at 846.
37. Id. at 966.
38. Id. (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955)).
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test. This seems illogical to me, but obviously not to Justice Rehnquist.
Even as he retreats, he defends his remaining ground with great tenacity, inch
by inch.
IV. PREGNANT WOMEN, RAILROAD BERTHS, DIRTY BOOKS, AND BOOKIES
The major purpose of this article is to explore Justice Rehnquist's use of
the Lee Optical case to defend his position that the Constitution does not
imply a "right of privacy" that extends to abortion rights. Yet, it also seems
fair to question whether Justice Blackmun, writing for the Roe majority,
misused or stretched precedent in concluding that the Constitution does
imply these rights. Let us take a look (more briefly than our examination of
the Lee Optical case) at the cases Blackmun cited as precedent in concluding
that "a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of
privacy, does exist under the Constitution.,, 39 The nine cases he cites for
these propositions, one broad and the other more narrow, are certainly a
mixed bag.4  The "line of decisions" he cited had no chronological order
(they ranged between 1886 and 1969), but they roughly tracked the
provisions of the Bill of Rights, as Blackmun stacked up his precedential
building blocks.
The first case seems an odd choice. Back in the nineteenth century,
Clara Botsford took a trip on the Union Pacific Railroad and was smacked on
the head by a Pullman berth, "causing a concussion" that left her with "great
suffering and pain to her in body and mind, and in permanent and increasing
injuries. 41 After she filed suit for damages, the railroad's lawyers moved
that Ms. Botsford be required "to submit to a surgical examination" by its
doctors, who agreed not to "expose" her body "in any indelicate
manner." 42 She refused, and the trial judge upheld her objection.43 The
Supreme Court agreed, holding that compelling anyone, "especially a
woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit it to the touch of a stranger,
39. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
40. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891); Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
41. Botsford, 141 U.S. at 250.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 251.
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without lawful authority, is an indignity, an assault and a trespass" in
violation of "common law" principles.44
But the Supreme Court went further in its Union Pacific Railway Co. v.
Botsford opinion. "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law,"
wrote Justice Horace Gray.4 "As well said by Judge Cooley," Gray
continued, "'The right to one's person may be said to be a right of complete
immunity: to be let alone."' 46 Justice Gray quoted in this passage from the
leading treatise on torts by the leading constitutional scholar of those times,
Judge Thomas Cooley of the Michigan Supreme Court.47 Cooley was best
known for his massive book, A Treatise on Constitutional Limitations, first
published in 1868, which elevated the "freedom of contract" to the
constitutional pantheon, from which it was finally dislodged by the Supreme
Court during the "Constitutional Revolution" of 1937.
48
Judge Cooley was not, however, the judicial reactionary that his
writings on economics seem to suggest. He was more of a nineteenth
century "liberal;" what we might now label as a "libertarian." His term, "the
right to be let alone," was later appropriated by Louis Brandeis, the "people's
lawyer," who joined the Supreme Court in 1916. It is ironic that the "right to
be let alone," which the Supreme Court first applied in a railroad tort case,
was transmuted by Louis Brandeis into a "right of privacy" that he first
applied to the field of commercial advertising. The long road from Botsford
to Roe wound through some very strange byways.
Brandeis actually invented "the right to privacy" before the Supreme
Court decided the Botsford case, in a seminal Harvard Law Review article he
wrote (with Joseph Warren) in 1890 with that title.49 Brandeis even used the
term "the right to life" in this article, although he employed it in a much
different sense than opponents of abortion now do. His article rejected the
rigid formalism of nineteenth-century jurisprudence; it reflected the rapid
growth of technology that propelled American society toward the twentieth
44. Id. at 252.
45. Id. at 251.
46. Botsford, 141 U.S. at 251 (citation omitted).
47. THOMAS MCINTYRE COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 438
(1868).
48. Id.
49. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193
(6th ed. 1890).
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century. "Political, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of
new rights," Brandeis wrote, "and the common law, in its eternal youth,
grows to meet the demands of society. 50 He noted that "in very early times"
the "right to life" afforded protection only against "battery in its various
foms" But, he continued, "now the right to life has come to mean the right
to enjoy life,--the right to be let alone."52
Significantly, Brandeis did not direct this "right to be let alone" against
state intrusion, but that of private individuals and corporations. He wanted
the common law to protect the individual's name and likeness from
commercial exploitation or exposure. "Instantaneous photographs and
newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and
domestic life," Brandeis complained, "and numerous mechanical devices
threaten[ed] to" invade personal privacy.53 He referred to the case of Marion
Manola, a Broadway actress whose "appearance in tights" had been
"photographed surreptitiously and without her consent" and used for
advertising purposes by the "Castle in the Air" company.54 Long before the
National Enquirer appeared on supermarket racks, Brandeis decried "the
invasion of privacy by the newspapers" and urged that "the law must afford
some remedy" to people like Marion Manola. 55
Having invented the "right to privacy" in the Harvard Law Review,
Brandeis repeated the term (and big chunks of his article) in later Supreme
Court opinions. Among the "mechanical devices" he had warned against in
1890 was the microphone, which could be attached to a telephone and
hooked up to a recording machine.56  These three "recent inventions"
threatened, he wrote, "to make good the prediction that 'what is whispered in
the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.' ' '57  Prophetically,
Brandeis had foreseen in 1890 the telephone wire-ta~ping that he denounced
in 1928, dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, 8 in which the Court's
majority upheld a federal law that authorized the interception and recording
of telephone conversations in criminal cases. 59 "The makers of our
Constitution," Brandeis chastised his colleagues, had "conferred, as against
50. Id. at 193.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 195.
54. Warren, supra note 49, at 195 n.7.
55. Id. at 195.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
59. Id. at 440.
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the Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men." 6
Justice Blackmun approvingly cited Brandeis' Olmstead dissent in his
Roe opinion. Blackmun also cited a 1969 Supreme Court opinion that
quoted extensively from this dissenting opinion, a case that reversed a
criminal conviction for possession of pornographic movies. 62 The Court's
opinion in Stanley v. Georgia,63 holding that the First Amendment protects
"the right to receive information and ideas" from state intrusion, relied on
Brandeis's Olmstead dissent for the proposition that the Constitution
embodies a "fundamental . . . right to be free, except in very limited
circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's
privacy." 64 Mr. Stanley certainly did not want the State of Georgia to restrict
his right "to receive information and ideas" from the raunchy movies he
concealed in his dresser drawers. But does this case really help Justice
Blackmun to answer the abortion question?
Some of the other cases cited by Justice Blackmun in his Roe opinion
seem even less supportive of the "right to privacy" than the Stanley
decision. Blackmun traced one of the "roots" of privacy rights to the Fourth
Amendment's protection against "unreasonable searches and seizures" by
65government agents. However, the Supreme Court opinions he cited on this
issue have only tenuous connections to this constitutional root. Along with
Brandeis' Olmstead dissent, Justice Blackmun cited two later decisions, one
involving a federal prosecution for placing sporting bets from a telephone
booth, and the other a state prosecution for possession of concealed
weapons. In the "bookie" case of Katz v. United States,66 the Court adopted
the position Brandeis had advocated in his Olmstead dissent, but with
significant limitations.67 The Court's majority in Katz held that "the Fourth
Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional 'right to
privacy. ' ' 68 Citing the 1890 Harvard Law Review article by Warren and
Brandeis, the Court noted that "protection of a person's general right to
privacy-his right to be let alone by other people-is, like the protection of
60. Id. at 478.
61. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
62. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969).
63. Id. at 557.
64. Id. at 564 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
65. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
66. Id. at 347.
67. Id. at 352.
68. Id. at 350.
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his property and of his very life, left largely to the law of the individual
States.
69
If the Katz case did not offer Justice Blackmun much support for his
Roe opinion, the Court's 1968 decision in Terry v. Ohio" offered even
less. In this criminal case, the defendant had been convicted of carrying a
concealed weapon.7' A suspicious police officer observed two men who had
been pacing up and down the sidewalk outside a Cleveland jewelry
store. His search revealed a loaded pistol in a pocket of Terry's overcoat.72
Upholding this "stop and frisk" search against a Fourth Amendment
challenge, Chief Justice Earl Warren cited and quoted from the Botsford and
Katz opinions for the proposition that individuals are "entitled to be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion" into their privacy.73 But Warren noted
that "the specific content and incidents of this right must be shaped by the
context in which it is asserted." 74 In his Terry opinion, Warren did not find a
"privacy" right that prevailed over the government's interest.
75
Two of the other cases that Justice Blackmun cited for support in his
Roe opinion did not use the term "privacy" or come even close to the
abortion issue. In 1923, the Supreme Court struck down a Nebraska law-
enacted during World War One-that banned the teaching of German in
public schools.76 The Court's decision in Meyer v. Nebraska interpreted the
"liberty" interest of the Fourteenth Amendment as protecting "those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by free men."78 That statement did not move Justice Blackmun
very far on his journey toward abortion rights.
Even less helpful was Blackmun's citation to Palko v. Connecticut,79
decided in 1937. This bizarre case involved a man who had been convicted
of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.80 The State appealed and was
granted a new trial.81 The jury in the second trial convicted him again and
69. Id. at 350-51.
70. 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
71. Id. at 2.
72. Id. at 1.
73. Id. at 9.
74. Id.
75. Terry, 392 U.S. at 9.
76. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
77. Id. at 390.
78. Id. at 399.
79. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
80. Id. at 321.
81. Id.
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sentenced Palko to die in the electric chair.82 His lawyers appealed to the
Supreme Court, citing the Fifth Amendment provision that protects any
person from being subjected "for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb. 83 The Supreme Court rejected Palko's appeal,
ruling that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution did not bind the
states to the federal rule.84 The Justices further held that constitutional rights
such as trial by jury and prosecution by grand jury indictment "are not of the
very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty."'s The Palko decision, which
cost the hapless defendant his life, was a very shaky precedent for Justice
Blackmun's later claim in his Roe opinion that the Texas criminal abortion
statute violated any right of privacy.
V. WHOSE THUMB WEIGHS HEAVIER ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL SCALE?
Justice Rehnquist cited only one case, Williamson v. Lee Optical, to
support his proposition that the Constitution does not imply a "right of
privacy" that can be extended to protect abortion rights.86 Justice Blackmun
cited nine cases to support his contrary position. Which of these two
Justices bested the other in this constitutional conflict? Blackmun had both
cases and votes on his side in Roe v. Wade. Seven Justices-including Chief
Justice Warren Burger-joined the majority opinion in the Roe decision.88
That majority eroded as public opinion shifted on the abortion
issue. Writing for the Court in 1989, Justice Rehnquist (who succeeded
Burger as Chief Justice in 1986) upheld significant restrictions on abortion
rights in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.89 Rehnquist employed the
"rational basis" test to endorse state laws that barred doctors from
"'encouraging or counseling' a woman to have an abortion not necessary to
save her life," and that subjected doctors to criminal penalties if they failed to
perform tests of fetal "viability" on women that they had "reason to believe"
82. Id.
83. Id. at 322 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V).
84. Palko, 302 U.S. at 323.
85. Id. at 325.
86. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
87. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
88. Roe, 410 U.S. at 115.
89. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
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were pregnant for twenty weeks or more.90 The Webster decision, which in
effect stationed police officers inside doctors' offices, did not overrule Roe,
but it deployed the "rational basis" test to undermine a ruling based on the
judicial standard of "strict scrutiny" of laws that implicated constitutional
rights.91
In the Webster case in 1989, Justice Rehnquist fell short by one vote of
his long-proclaimed goal of applying the "rational basis" test to the abortion
question, and thereby reversing the Roe decision. Three years later, in the
Casey decision in 1992, Rehnquist lost even more ground.92 Only Justices
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas (both fervent Roman Catholics) joined
Rehnquist (a Calvinist Lutheran) in voting to overturn Roe.93 Was it
religious persuasion or belief in the "rational basis" test that influenced
judicial votes in the Casey decision? In my opinion, neither of these factors
determined the outcome. Justice Anthony Kennedy, who voted in Casey to
"reaffirm" the central holding of the Roe case, was an equally fervent Roman
Catholic and a former alter boy. But Kennedy believed that his "personal
reluctance" to uphold abortion rights must yield to his conviction that "the
Court's legitimacy depends on making legally principled decisions" that will
be "accepted by the Nation.
94
Justice Kennedy's reference to the public's perception of the Court's
"legitimacy" introduces a new factor into the judicial balancing of individual
rights and state powers. The "strict scrutiny" and "rational basis" tests of
legislation both focus their judicial lenses on lawmakers. In contrast, the
"legitimacy" test looks to the public for support. The triumvirate of
Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter called on "the contending sides of a national
controversy to end their national division by accepting a common mandate
rooted in the Constitution."95 However, that mandate was not rooted in any
explicit or even implicit constitutional provision. It rested, Kennedy
explained, in the Court's reluctance to "surrender to political pressure" and to
"overrule under fire" a "watershed decision" upon which an entire generation
of women had relied.96
Where does the Casey decision leave us in deciding whether Justice
Rehnquist or Justice Blackmun had the stronger argument in the Roe
case? In my opinion, Justice Kennedy lured the Court down an enticing, but
90. Id. at 501.
91. Id. at 503.
92. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
93. Id. at 833.
94. Id. at 866.
95. Id. at 867.
96. Id.
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dangerous, bypass of the constitutional crossroad that Rehnquist and
Blackmun forced us to confront. The "rational basis" road on which
Rehnquist travels has few bumps or potholes. Under the doctrine of legal
positivism, whatever the legislature enacts is constitutional, with only the
most egregious exceptions. The "strict scrutiny" road on which Blackmun
crosses this judicial intersection forces judges to look closely at the
"compelling state interest" in the challenged legislation. It requires more of
judges, but it also requires more of legislators, which I consider a good
thing. All too often, elected officials become what Justice Robert Jackson
called "village tyrants" in bowing to popular demands to punish an unpopular
group or criminalize unpopular behavior.97 The more that such officials
know their actions will face the "strict scrutiny" of judges who need not fear
electoral retribution, the more (hopefully) they will think before they vote.
To my mind, it is ironic that Justice Rehnquist clerked for Justice
Jackson, whose 1943 opinion in West Virginia Board of Education v.
Barnette98 remains the classic statement of the limits of the "rational basis"
test. The right of a state to regulate a business (i.e., eyeglasses), includes the
"power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a
'rational basis' for adopting," he wrote.99 "But freedoms of speech and of
press, of assembly, and of worship may not be infringed on such slender
grounds."' °  Jackson widened his judicial vision. "One's right to life,
liberty, and property," he added, "and other fundamental rights may not be
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections."' 0'1 It may be
presumptuous for me to suggest that Justice Rehnquist dig out Volume 319
of the United States Reports and read Justice Jackson's majestic opinion in
the Barnette case. If he does, and if he thinks about the spirit of Jackson's
words, I hope he will conclude that laws designed to punish women who
choose abortion over childbirth deserve "more exacting judicial scrutiny"
than laws that regulate the eyeglass industry.
97. West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
98. Id. at 624.
99. Id. at 639.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 638.
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